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THE CASE OF THE UNWANTED BLESSING:
WRONGFUL LIFE
JOSEPH S. KASHI*
The recognition of a cause of action for "wrongful life" is a
relatively recent occurrence. In this article the author compiles
the leading cases from many jurisdictions and presents an analyt-
ical framework for the treatment thereof. The author concludes
by presenting the policy arguments in favor of allowing a cause
of action for the cases which are loosely and inappropriately
termed "wrongful life."
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"For the living there is hope, but for the dead there is none."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the courts have traditionally regarded life as uni-
formly constituting a blessing, in a relatively recent class of cases,
parents and even their offspring have sought damages for what has
loosely been termed "wrongful life." Upon analyzing the cases, it
appears that they fall into three distinct categories.
In the first group of cases, parents sue when a child is conceived
although one of the spouses submitted to a sterilization operation
or practiced some method of contraception. Suit may be predicated
upon negligence or breach of contract, and the defendant may be
either a physician or pharmacist or even a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer. Given the nature of the alleged wrong, it will be observed that
the gravamen of the complaint is not wrongful life at all, but wrong-
ful conception, for it is at the moment of conception that the dam-
age results and the cause of action accrues.
In the second group of cases, an illegitimate child sues the
party responsible for its birth for the damages to which it is exposed
* J.D., Oklahoma City University; LL.M., New York University; Associate with the firm
of Druck, Grimmett, Scherer & James, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Theocritus, quoted in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
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as a result of its illegitimate status. The defendant may be a parent
or parents or one having a duty to protect the infant's mother from
sexual assault. Here, once again, it is more realistic to think of the
damages not in terms of wrongful life but of emotional trauma re-
sulting from the stigma of bastardy.
In the final group of cases, the parents of a child afflicted with
birth defects, and sometimes the child itself, sue the physician who
attended the mother during pregnancy for failing to apprise her of
the probability of unavoidable birth defects in time to terminate the
pregnancy. Here, although the term wrongful life may hold a haunt-
ing sense of reality, notions of the sanctity of all human life make
it preferable to think of the damages as being for unfortunate cir-
cumstances of life.
This article will examine the foregoing causes of action, the
public policy issues they generate, and the nature and recoverability
of the damages suffered.
II. WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
Christensen v. Thornby2 was the earliest case to confront the
issue whether parents suffer legal damage as a consequence of the
birth of an unplanned child. There, the plaintiff engaged the ser-
vices of the defendant-physician to perform a vasectomy upon him
after being advised that his wife, who had already given birth to one
child, might not survive another pregnancy. Notwithstanding the
performance of the operation, the plaintiffs wife conceived and gave
birth to another child after an uneventful pregnancy. Thereafter,
the plaintiff brought an action in which he sought to recover dam-
ages for his anxiety and expenses, alleging that the defendant had
warranted the success of the procedure. After observing that the
performance of a sterilization operation under the circumstances of
the instant case did not offend the public policy of the state, the
court affirmed an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's com-
plaint, stating:
The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the
hazards to her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not
the alleged purpose to save the expense incident to pregnancy
and delivery. The wife has survived. Instead of losing his wife, the
plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child.'
2. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
3. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622. The court's approach fails to take into consideration that,
[Vol. 31:1409
WRONGFUL LIFE
The court in Shaheen v. Knight4 viewed with similar disfavor
the parent's asserted cause of action. In that case, the plaintiff sued
the defendant-physician for breach of contract when the vasectomy
the defendant had warranted proved unsuccessful and a fifth child
was born to the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted to the operation
not for therapeutic reasons but to enable the plaintiff "to support
his family in comfort and educate it."' Accordingly, when the physi-
cian breached his contract, the plaintiff sought as damages the ex-
pense of raising his unplanned child. The court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground "that to allow damages for the normal birth
of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of the
people."' The court added:
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the
physician would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which
plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of this
[plaintiff's] fifth child. Many people would be willing to support
this child were they given the right of custody and adoption, but
according to plaintiff's statement, plaintiff does not want such.
He wants to have the child and wants to have the doctor to
support it. In our opinion to allow such damages would be against
public policy.7
Although not all of the early cases considering the issue ex-
pressed such a hostile view towards the parents' cause of action,' the
although avoidance of the medical expenses incident to childbirth was not the plaintiff's
prime motivation in undergoing the operative procedure, the anxiety suffered and the expen-
ses incurred by the plaintiff were certainly foreseeable results of the unsuccessful operation.
Thus, if the defendant did in fact warrant the success of the procedure, he should be held
liable for the damages caused by its failure.
4. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 45.
7. This argument ignores the best interests of the unplanned child. See text accompany-
ing notes 29 to 31.
In the following cases, the courts refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
conception: Hartens v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974) (unsuccessful vasectomy);
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 9 (Del. 1975) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Aronoffv. Snider, 292
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Maley v. Armstrong, No. 83195 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Jan. 11,
1967)(birth control pills) cited in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 316, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463, 471 n.10 (1967); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974)(unsuccessful
vasectomy); Terrell v. Garcia 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), writ ref'd n.r.e., cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.
Civ. App.) rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (misdiagnosis of pregnancy).
8. West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
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first major breakthrough occurred when the California Court of
Appeal decided the case of Custodio v. Bauer9 in 1967. Plaintiff, the
mother of nine children, submitted to a therapeutic sterilization
upon the advice of her physicians that another pregnancy would
aggravate an existing bladder and kidney disorder. After the opera-
tion had been performed, the plaintiff conceived yet another child
and sued her physicians, alleging that their unskillful treatment was
responsible for the pregnancy.
In all, the plaintiff and her husband alleged seven causes of
action:'I
1. negligence in the performance of the operation;
2. negligent failure to warn the plaintiff of the fallibility of the
sterilization procedure, so that contraception would have been
practiced;
3. failure to obtain the informed consent of the plaintiff, in that
she was not apprised of the alternative methods of achieving
sterilization;
4. negligent misrepresentation in advising the plaintiff that she
was incapable of conception, and that, therefore, it was unneces-
sary for her to practice any method of contraception;
5. plaintiff-husband's right to compensation for damages aris-
ing from the preceding tortious acts;
6. fraud and deceit in knowingly misrepresenting to the plaintiff
and her husband that the operation had been a success in order
to induce the plaintiffs to pay for the services rendered;" and
7. breach of a contract to successfully sterilize the plaintiff.
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the com-
plaint on the ground of insufficiency, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The significance of the appellate decision, however, lies not in its
holding that the plaintiffs' factual allegations were legally sufficient
to state the several causes of action averred, but in its discussion of
the issues of proximate cause, public policy, and damages.
The court rejected the defendants' patently absurb suggestion
that the plaintiffs' act of sexual intercourse constituted an interven-
9. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
10. Id. at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
11. The defendants claimed that no fraud had been perpetrated, because their state-
ments concerning the success of the operation merely constituted the expression of an opin-
ion. The court rejected this argument, because the defendants were experts hired to provide
the plaintiff with information concerning a subject within the scope of their expertise, and
the defendants' statements were unequivocal. Id. at 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
[Vol. 31:1409
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ing cause sufficient to purge the defendants' acts of their liability
producing character. After all, the risk of pregnancy from sexual
intercourse was the very one which the defendants had undertaken
to avert.
The court resolved that not only therapeutic sterilizations but
those "motivated solely by personal or socio-economic considera-
tions [are] . . . not antithetical to public policy."' 2 This view is
bolstered by the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade recognizing a woman's right-sometimes
absolute 4 and at other times qualified"'-to terminate her preg-
nancy by means of abortion. If the public policy is not violated by
the termination of pregnancy after its inception, then a fortiori the
public policy is not violated by the commission of purposeful acts
to the end of preventing the condition of pregnancy from ever aris-
ing.
At this point, it should be observed that an aura of speculation
as to damages was introduced by virtue of the fact that suit had
been commenced after conception but prior to birth in order to toll
the statute of limitations. 6 This obstacle, however, did not perturb
the intrepid court, for it held that, if a breach of the defendants'
duty could be established, the outlay for the unsuccessful operation
would serve as the bottom line of recovery. Moreover, if the birth,
or even its mere contemplation, were to cause demonstrable physi-
cal or mental pain and suffering, these would constitute foreseeable
and, thus, compensable items of damage. Were the plaintiff to die
12. Id. at 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. I.e., during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163.
15. Le., during the last two trimesters of pregnancy. Id. at 163-64.
16. For wrongful life cases specifically dealing with the statute of limitations see Bishop
v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 322, 220 N.E.2d
767 (1966); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d
166 (Ky. 1970); Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (1974); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.
2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947);
Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1974); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.
Civ. App.), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
It should be emphasized that, in actions for wrongful conception, as in all legal actions,
the practical constraint posed by the statute of limitations may not be overlooked. Because
of the nature of the circumstances and rights involved, it is conceivable that the statute of
limitations could run before the plaintiff ever learns that a cause of action in fact existed.
Therefore, it is particularly appropriate in these cases to apply the rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run from the time plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the
defendant's breach of duty.
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during delivery, an action for wrongful death would lie in favor of
the plaintiff's husband and remaining children. If the plaintiff were
to survive the delivery but sustain a crippling disability, she could
sue for her physical injuries and her husband could recover for loss
of services and medical expenses. Even if the plaintiff were to sur-
vive the delivery free of any untoward result, a specie of damage
would nevertheless be incurred, because the mother necessarily
"must spread her society, comfort, care, protection and support over
a larger group. If this change in the family status can be measured
economically it should be as compensable as the former losses."' 7
The court was critical of Christensen"5 and Shaheen," empha-
sizing that the purpose of damage awards in cases such as the pres-
ent one is not to compensate the parents for an unwanted child but
rather to "replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival
will not deprive the other members of the family of what was
planned as their just share of the family income." 0 The court con-
demned as inconsistent with family stability the suggestion in
Shaheen that, if the expense of raising unplanned children is not
outweighed by the rewards of parenthood, dissatisfied parents
should place their children for adoption. This indeed is a rather
callous view to be expounded by the guardian of virtue the Shaheen
court fantasized itself as being. Furthermore, it entirely misses the
issue presented in these cases by overlooking the fact that, as stated
17. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
18. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
19. 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
20. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Contra, Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d
418 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974).
Cox was an unsuccessful vasectomy case in which the court refused to recognize a cause
of action in favor of the plaintiff's prior born children for the loss of that portion of their
parents' love, guidance, and support which would have been received but for the birth of the
unplanned child. It was observed that
infants are not entitled as a matter of right to any specific share of their parents'
wealth, much less their "care," "affection" or "training." The law cannot require
a parent to love or train a child. It forbids abuse and abandonment but it does
not compel devotion.
Id. at 160, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 840. Although this is quite true, the mere fact that the law does
not compel the parents' affection should not frustrate the child's cause of action if that
affection would have been voluntarily forthcoming but for the defendant's tortious act. What
is significant is that the damage was foreseeable and would not have occurred in the absence
of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Similarly, although the child is not entitled as of right
to enjoy a particular standard of living, if its lot in life is diminished because the family's
economic resources are spread thinly as a result of the defendant's breach of duty, there is
no logical reason why that child should be denied relief.
[Vol. 31:1409
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by one court, these children are not "unwanted or unloved, but...
unplanned."'" Although the plaintiffs may not have wished to un-
dertake the responsibility of parenthood, once that regponsibility
has been thrust upon them, they may nevertheless find themselves
equal to the task. Indeed, people such as these, who fully appreciate
the enormity of a parent's responsibilities, may in fact make the
finest parents. But it must not be forgotten that it is the defendant's
wrongful act which has forced the status of parent upon the plain-
tiff, and thus, the interest the plaintiff sought to preserve by avoid-
ing parenthood should be placed intact once again by the defendant.
Thus, if the plaintiff could not afford the expense of raising a child,
there is no sound reason in logic or public policy why the defendant
should not be responsible for this cost. Reliance on the Restatement
of Torts section 920 (1939)22 is misplaced. That section provides that
benefit to the plaintiff accruing from the defendant's tortious acts
may be considered in mitigation of the injury such acts have pro-
duced. It is clearly provided, however, that the benefit must be to
the interest which was harmed. Thus, in the hypothetical of the
undercapitalized parent, the rewards of parenthood may not be con-
sidered in mitigation of the concomitant financial burden associated
with that status, because these rewards are emotional in nature and,
great though they may be, do nothing whatever to benefit the plain-
tiff's injured financial interests.
Another celebrated case recognizing a cause of action for wrong-
ful conception, albeit not under that epithet, was Troppi v. Scarf.23
There, the defendant-druggist negligently substituted a mild tran-
quilizer for the birth control pills which had been prescribed by the
plaintiff's physician, and notwithstanding the fact that she duti-
fully took a tranquilizer each day, the thirty-seven year old plain-
tiff's equanimity was shattered when she discovered she was preg-
nant for the ninth time. When sued, the druggist argued that the
plaintiff had no cause for complaint, because she was blessed with
a healthy child. The plaintiff remained unmollified, however, and
she and her husband sought four items of damage:24 (1) the
21. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
22. Restatement of Torts § 920 (1939) states: "Where the defendant's tortious conduct
has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the
plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable."
23. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
24. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
plaintiff-wife's lost wages; (2) medical expenses; (3) pain and anxi-
ety associated with childbirth; and (4) economic costs of raising the
unplanned child. Although the issue is somewhat mooted by Roe
v. Wade," it is noteworthy that the court in Troppi rejected the
notion that recognition of the plaintiff's cause of action would vio-
late thp public policy. In support of its holding, the court cited
payments by the state for contraceptives as part of its welfare pro-
gram, widespread use of contraceptives by the public, and the con-
stitutional cloak of privacy protecting the use of contraceptives by
married couples.2" The court reasoned that, since the state could not
interfere with the right of married couples to use contraceptives, it
could not render this right nugatory by exempting the negligent
purveyors of contraceptives from civil liability.
Next, the court refused to hold as a matter of law that the
benefits of parenthood always exceed the costs. However, it inter-
preted the Restatement benefit rule27 far more liberally than did the
court in Custodio v. Bauer."5 According to Troppi, the benefits and
burdens of pregnancy and parenthood are so integrally related that
they should be balanced against each other in applying the same
interest limitation to the benefit rule. The court believed that
applying the benefit rule in this manner would be best calculated
to achieve a fair assessment of damages according to the circum-
stances of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances it regarded
as being of the greatest moment were the plaintiff's economic re-
sources, family size, age, and marital status.2"
Although the court's reasoning possesses an initial allure, closer
examination reveals that it is fatally flawed. Certainly, the birth of
the child may confer certain intangible emotional benefits upon the
parent, but these are benefits the parent did not ask for and quite
possibly cannot afford. The defendant can be analogized to an offi-
cious intermeddler, and when he argues that the damages assessed
against him should be offset by the unsolicited benefits of parent-
hood, the resemblance is quite striking indeed. Let us say that there
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. 31 Mich. App. at 252-54, 187 N.W.2d at 517 citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). Griswold's protection was extended to unmarrieds in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
27. Restatement of Torts § 920 (1939), supra note 22.
28. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
29. 31 Mich. App. at 254-55, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
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are two adjacent and uninhabited tracts of land, one owned by the
plaintiff and the other owned by the defendant. The defendant
wishes to erect a house on his tract, but as a result of a negligent
error, erects it on the plaintiff's property instead. When the parties
discover the error, they are unable to settle their differences and
look to the judicial system for a Solomon-like decision. Three possi-
bilities are immediately apparent.
First, the parties may be left as we find them, on the ground
that the defendant has conferred an unsolicited benefit upon the
plaintiff for which the latter party should not be made to pay. The
problem with this approach is that it is quite harsh on the defendant
and may unjustly enrich the plaintiff.
Second, the plaintiff may be required to pay the defendant an
amount equal to the value of the improvement to the plaintiff. If
this approach is followed, the defendant may not recoup his costs,
but at least unjust enrichment of the plaintiff is avoided.
Finally, if the plaintiff does not wish to retain the benefit, the
defendant may be permitted to enter upon the plaintiff's land for
the limited purpose of removing the building to the defendant's own
tract.
It will be observed that the Troppi court has followed the sec-
ond solution, and although this is a most equitable approach when
inanimate objects are at issue, it is wholly inadequate when we are
dealing with children. To illustrate this assertion, let us examine the
plight of the forced parent of modest resources, who cannot afford
to raise his unplanned child. If the second solution is followed, the
plaintiff's damage award will be reduced by the benefits of parent-
hood, that is, those intangible feelings of love we hope most parents
feel for their children. At once, a great anomaly becomes apparent;
the more loving the parent, the smaller the damage award and the
more the entire family will suffer as scarce economic resources are
spread over a greater number of family members.
So what are we to do, follow the third solution and place the
child for adoption? Certainly not, the Troppi court itself rejects the
very idea as abhorent, stating: "The law has long recognized the
desirability of permitting a child to be reared by his natural par-
ents."30 If the forced parent is willing to shoulder the enormous
responsibility of parenthood, the law should not throw obstacles in
30. Id. at 259, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
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his path but rather should endeavor to do everything in its power
to assist him. If this places a difficult burden on the defendant, it
is well to remember that he is a tortfeasor, and it is far more equita-
ble to shift the burden to him than to the plaintiffs who placed their
faith in him, or the innocent infant for whose birth he is responsible.
What then of the argument that the mother should abort the
unplanned child? The very suggestion carries a pungent odor of
moral depravity. The defendant, whose tortious act is responsible
for the conception of the child, would now force the termination of
its existence so that the damages assessed against him might be
minimized. Moreover, the defendant, who has committed one tres-
pass upon the mother's body, would expose her to yet another tres-
pass.
It thus becomes apparent that the first solution, which seemed
so harsh when applied to houses, is in fact the most equitable when
applied to children. But our examples have dealt with the forced
parent of modest resources. Does this suggest a sort of discrimina-
tion against the affluent? It is submitted that the affluent are just
as worthy of recovery as the humble. In both cases, economic re-
sources (though scarcer in one situation than the other) must be
spread over a greater number of family members with the result that
existing members will receive less than their planned share. It might
even be argued that, since the tortfeasor takes his plaintiff as he
finds him, the damages awarded to the affluent family should even
be greater, so existing family members may maintain their current
standard of living, and the latest addition to the family will not have
to live as a "second class citizen." It could also be argued, however,
that the financial injury to the affluent family, although greater in
the aggregate, is proportionately less, so that, out of some solicitude
for the defendant, the damages should be geared to the average cost
of raising a child with the family supplying anything over that
amount if it so desires.
At this point, it is worth distinguishing between those situa-
tions in which pregnancy is sought to be avoided altogether and
those in which it is merely to be postponed for a time. In the former
situation, the damage award should include the cost of raising the
unplanned child for his entire infancy; in the latter situation, the
damage award should only include the cost of raising the child
[Vol. 31:1409
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during that period of time in which pregnancy was sought to be
avoided. :"
III. EMOTIONAL TRAUMA RESULTING FROM THE STIGMA OF BASTARDY
Zepeda v. Zepeda,32 decided by the Appellate Court of Illinois
in 1963, was a case of first impression. As stated in the amicus brief
of the renowned family law authority, Max Rheinstein, the claim
advanced was "novel," 33 lacking statutory or judicial precedent in
any common or civil law jurisdiction. Rising to the occasion, the
court authored a sensitive and insightful opinion, unparalleled by
the subsequent decisions from other jurisdictions confronting the
issue it was the first to face.
In Zepeda, the defendant induced the plaintiff's mother to
enter into adulterous intercourse by concealing his existing marriage
and fraudulently promising to marry her. The plaintiff, whose ille-
gitimate birth resulted from the illicit union, sought "damages for
the deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a nor-
mal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to in-
herit from his paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a
bastard."34 At the outset, the court characterized the complaint as
31. Other cases recognizing a cause of action for wrongful conception are: Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (unsuccessful sterilization); Stills v. Gratton, 55
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (misdiagnosis of pregnancy); Pearson v. Say-On
Drugs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 307, opinion withdrawn, 1974 Rptr. H.R.L. IV-A-1 (wrong prescrip-
tion); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (unsuccessful sterilization);
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975). Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d
377 (Ky. 1971) (unsuccessful sterilization); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 680
(1967) (failure to warn of rubella); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1974) (misdiagnosis of pregnancy); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Coloff v. Hi-Ho Shopping Center, Inc., No. 168070
(Wash. Super. Ct. 1966) (wrong prescription) cited in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d at
316, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.10 (1967).
In the following cases, the plaintiffs did not prevail, but the courts impliedly recognized
a cause of action for wrongful conception: Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98
(S.D. W. Va. 1971) (ineffective oral contraceptive); Hill v. Geathers, No. 633174 (Cal. Co.
Ct. 1975) reported in 1975 Rptr. H.R.L. IV-A-8 (unsuccessful abortion); Medinas v. Spindler,
No. 415394 (Cal. Co. Ct. 1973) reported in 1974 Rptr. H.R.L. IV-A-3 (unsuccessful vasec-
tomy); Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d 60 (Colo. App. 1975) (unsuccessful tubal ligation); Lane
v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Rogala v. Silva, 16
Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1973) (unsuccessful sterilization); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.
2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (unsuccessful vasectomy).
32. 41111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
33. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
34. Id.
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sounding in tort and, therefore, rejected the plaintiff's contention
that he should be regarded as a third party beneficiary of the con-
tract to marry. Proceeding then from a tort viewpoint, the court
discussed seriatim the obstacles to the maintenance of the suit.
The court stated quite freely that the defendant's conduct was
"tortious in its nature, ' 35 because of his willful indifference to the
foreseeable consequences of his act. In fact, the court noted that
defendant's conduct may even have been criminal. Conceding the
tortious character of the act, one of the initial questions facing the
court was whether an actionable wrong could "be inflicted upon a
being simultaneously with its conception."3 The court paid obei-
sance to the ancient rule of tort law that there can be no recovery
for prenatal physical injuries and then traced the rule's erosion
through the Bonbrest v. Kotz37 line of cases, which provide that
prenatal physical injuries may be the subject of legal action if the
child "was viable at the time of the injury and if it survived birth.""8
Then, taking a common sense approach, the court shifted the em-
phasis from the viability of the infant to the foreseeability of the
harm and, since this element was present, proceeded to confront the
next issue, concerning the character of the plaintiff's injury. 9
Although the court acknowledged that, under the facts, the
complaint could have been drawn in such a manner as to state a
cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the complaint did not charge mental distress and could not be sus-
tained on that ground. Moreover, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for defamation. 0 Although the fact of the plaintiffs
illegitimacy might be injurious to his reputation, publication was
not alleged, and even if it had been, the defense of truth certainly
would have been applicable.
Directing its attention to the damages claimed in the com-
plaint, the court observed that not even a legitimate child could
''maintain an action against his own parents for lack of affection,
35. Id. at 247.
36. Id.
37. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
38. 41111. App. 2d at 248, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
39. Actually, it was unnecessary for the court to deal with the prenatal injury issue,
because the wrong to the infant occurs not at conception but the moment he is born out of
wedlock. Nevertheless, the court is to be commended for its progressive approach in dealing
with the issue.
40. 41 111. App. 2d at 254, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
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for failure to provide a pleasant home, for disrupting the family life
or for being responsible for a divorce which has broken up the
home."'" Furthermore, although the court did not address this
point, it should be noted that no child has a vested right to inherit
from his father, and even legitimate issue may be disinherited. Nev-
ertheless, the court fully appreciated that
[c]hildren born illegitimate have suffered an injury. If legitima-
tion does not take place, the injury is continuous. If legitimation
cannot take place, the injury is irreparable.
The injury is not as tangible as a physical defect but it is as
real. This is acknowledged by the State itself. The statutory pro-
visions that a child's illegitimacy must be suppressed, in certain
public records, is an admission of the hardship that can be caused
by its disclosure. How often during his life does an illegitimate
try to conceal his parentage and how often does he wince in
shame when it is revealed? Public opinion may bring about more
laws ameliorating further his legal status, but laws cannot temper
the cruelty of those who hurl the epithet "bastard" nor ease the
bitterness in him who hears it, knowing it to be true. This, how-
ever is but one phase, one manifestation of the basic injury, which
is in being born and remaining an illegitimate. An illegitimate's
very birth places him under a disability.42
Notwithstanding its sensitivity to the plight of the illegitimate
child, the court refused to recognize a new cause of action for what
it characterized as "wrongful life." 43 To do so, feared the court,
would encourage other problematical claims." In fact, the ramifica-
tions of the new cause of action were so overwhelming that the court
felt it necessary to leave its adoption to the discretion of the legisla-
ture, after that body's thorough consideration.45
41. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 255, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
42. Id. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
43. Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
44. The court explained:
Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world under conditions
they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for being born a certain
color, another because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease,
another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into
a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputa-
tion.
Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
45. When presented with similar cases, the courts of other jurisdictions have also refused
to extend legal sanction to the claims of illegitimate children. Thus, in Williams v. State, 18
N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966), the plaintiff alleged that she was forced
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Although the court refrained from adopting a new cause of ac-
tion for "wrongful life," it should be recalled that the court did
acknowledge that the facts were susceptible to a complaint predi-
cated upon the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, it
is worthwhile to examine whether there can be recovery for emo-
tional trauma resulting from the stigma of bastardy under the exist-
ing framework of the law.
At the outset, it should be recognized that an infant's action for
emotional distress might be premature in the sense that he would
not yet feel the effects of his illegitimate birth. Thus, although he
would be damaged in a legal sense, the infant's injuries would be
prospective from an emotional standpoint. Therefore, damages for
emotional distress, if permitted, would be unavoidably speculative
in nature unless suit were postponed until the plaintiff grew older.
Of course, this assumes that the statute of limitations would be
tolled during infancy and that jurisdiction could later be obtained
over the defendant.
Furthermore, the problem should be analyzed in a broader fac-
tual context than that presented by the principal case. Let us as-
sume that an unmarried man and woman cohabit, that no deception
is practiced and that a child is born of their meretricious relation-
ship. Let us further assume, in the first instance, that no method
of contraception is employed. A cause of action for the intentional
to suffer the pains of illegitimacy, because her incompetent mother was raped in a state
hospital for the mentally ill as a result of the state's failure to maintain an adequate vigil for
her protection. The court declined to engage in judicial law-making by recognizing a cause
of action in the infant-plaintiff, essentially characterizing her dilemma as damnum absque
injuria.
In Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), overruled on other grounds,
Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1974), plaintiff's father mortally wounded her mother,
and plaintiff, who was born of her parents' meretricious relationship, sought damages from
her father for wrongful death and "having to live under the continuing stigma of bastardy."
198 So. 2d at 53. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claim growing out of the plaintiff's
status as a bastard, stating that an illegitimate's father's sole duty is his statutory obligation
of support and that plaintiffs purported cause of action should be recognized, if at all, by
the legislature.
In Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974), a complex and intriguing case
in which a counterclaim for "wrongful life" was asserted by an adulterine bastard, the court
followed Zepeda, declaring that recognition of the cause of action was a matter for legislative
cognizance. Similarly, in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976), an
unsuccessful abortion case, the court refused to recognize an adulterine bastard's asserted
cause of action for "wrongful life" because of the logical impossibility of comparing an imper-
fect life to no life at all.
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infliction of emotional distress might lie, and the parents might be
subject to liability as joint tortfeasors. Of course, the action could
not be maintained unless the defendant had intended to cause se-
vere emotional distress in the plaintiff, but since it is substantially
certain that sexual intercourse will culminate in the birth of a child
when contraception is not practiced, the requisite intent might be
found to oxigt.
But what if the couple practiced contraception? Would this not
subject them, at most, to liability for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress?"6 In this regard, it should be remembered that,
since no method of contraception is currently foolproof, conception
is always foreseeable, even if unlikely. If the couple carefully ad-
hered to a relatively safe method of contraception, however, they
might not be considered negligent. Even if an action for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress were maintainable, the plaintiff
might still have the formidable task of proving that the emotional
distress manifested itself in the form of physical injury."
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the current framework of
the law is insufficiently flexible to provide a meaningful remedy for
infants who suffer emotional trauma resulting from the stigma of
bastardy. Therefore, if it is socially desirable that a remedy be pro-
vided, it is suggested that unwed, heterosexual couples, voluntarily
engaging in sexual intercourse, be held strictly liable to children
born of the union who suffer emotional trauma as a result of the
stigma of bastardy. Whether their act be regarded as intentional,
negligent, or even nonnegligent is immaterial from the illegitimate
child's point of view. Thus, it may be argued that, so long as a risk
of pregnancy exists, no matter how slight, it is one which should be
borne by the partners to the sex act and not by the innocent child
who is its product. Furthermore, in order to overcome the problem
of premature damages, general damages, akin to those recoverable
in an action for slander per se, could be made available to infant
plaintiffs. Although it could be argued that such damages might
expose defendants to unwarranted liability, it could be countered
that it is the defendants' voluntary act which has created the uncer-
tainty, so they should not be heard to complain.
46. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 32 (4th ed. 1974).
47. In an action for the negligent infliction of mental distress, an accompanying physical
injury must generally be shown. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 329 (4th ed. 1971).
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The issue now arises whether it is desirable from a public policy
viewpoint to provide redress for emotional trauma resulting from
the stigma of bastardy. A negative answer to this query is suggested.
A threshold problem is provided by the family immunity rule,
which, although declining in significance, cannot be disregarded
altogether." The rule is designed to promote family harmony. In the
case of a father who has never acknowledged his illegitimate child,
allowance of suit would be unlikely to result in domestic discord,
but a very real problem would be posed were the illegitimate child
to sue its custodial mother, who, as suggested, may be subject to
liability as a joint tortfeasor,
Another problem which would be produced by these suits, par-
ticularly if both parents were vulnerable to them, is the danger of a
type of "shotgun" marriage, which could be equally or even more
damaging to the child than his bastardy. The possibility exists that,
while the defendants may have made compatible sex partners, their
forced marriage could result in a tempestuous union with unfortun-
ate ramifications for the child. If loveless marriages are viewed as
an unlikely consequence of these suits, witness the phenomenon of
husbands remaining unhappily married to their spouses to avoid the
payment of alimony and adverse property settlements.
In addition, if the mother were subject to suit, there might be
an incentive to abort the child, and it is urged that life as a bastard
is preferable to the utter absence of life. At least if born, the child
has an opportunity to overcome what may be regarded as an initial
handicap and make a meaningful life for itself. In any event, the
mother's decision whether to give birth to the child or abort should
be influenced by more important considerations than the possibility
of an adverse tort judgment.
Moreover, even if only the illegitimate's father were to be sub-
ject to suit, this would result in the imposition of a greater duty on
the fathers of illegitimate children than on the fathers of legitimate
children. It is to be recognized that, in law, the parent has only two
duties to his child. One is affirmative and requires that the parent
support his progeny. Even this duty is not absolute, because the
child may be placed for adoption. The other duty is negative and
48. See the recent case of Holodook v. Spencer, 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1973), rev'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d
338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974), in which the doctrine reared its head once again.
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requires that the parent refrain from physically abusing his child.
The parent is not required to love his. child or provide it with a
happy home, much less a happy life. But precisely such a duty
would be imposed upon the illegitimate's father if the suits under
consideration were given legal sanction.
Finally, it is maintained that any injury to the child as a result
of his bastardy is not the fault of his parents but of the sexual
immaturity of society in its treatment of illegitimate persons. Al-
though it could be argued that, given this sexual immaturity, the
defendant should take his plaintiff as he finds him, in this context,
the time honored rule must yield to individualism and the evolution
of a more mature outlook regarding sex in American society. 9 After
all, is the illegitimate's father any more culpable than a father who
divorces his wife and whose only contact with the child is the pay-
ment of its support? Would not the illegitimate's cause of action
vanish if his father married his mother and immediately filed suit
for divorce?
49. It should be observed that Oregon has eradicated the legal significance of illegiti-
macy. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1957) provides: The legal status and legal relationships and
the rights and obligations between a person and his descendants, and between a person and
his parents, their descendants and kindred, are the same for all persons, whether or not the
parents have been married.
A similar statute was to be found in Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-206, but it was
repealed and superseded. ARIz. REV. STAT. §14-2109, Section 14-206 provided:
A. Every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to
support and education as if born in lawful wedlock, except that he is not entitled
to the right to dwell or reside with the family of his father, if the father is married.
B. Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from their kindred heir,
lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children born in lawful wedlock.
C. This section shall apply although the natural father of such child is married
to a woman other than the mother of the child, as well as when he is single.
Section 14-2109 provides:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must
be established to determine succession by, through or from a person:
2. [A] person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also
a child of the father, if either:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after
the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void.
(b) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the
father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that
paternity established under this subdivision is ineffective to qualify the father or
his kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly
treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child.
It is most regretable that the Arizona Legislature chose to abandon its former, progressive
posture concerning the legal rights of illegitimate children.
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What of those people who may wish to live together and raise
children without marrying? Must they be subject to suit? Or what
of an unmarried woman who wishes to have a child but not a hus-
band and indulges in a brief sexual interlude or resorts to artificial
insemination? Must her individuality be punished? Or what if sci-
entists succeed in simulating life?5 Will they have committed the
ultimate sin by creating a child with no parents at all? It is earnestly
submitted that, if the illegitimate has anyone to blame for the
stigma of bastardy, it is society, and, if a cause of action should be
permitted at all, it should be against the attorney general as the
representative of the state.
IV. UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIFE
Gleitman v. Cosgrove5 was another pioneering case. There,
plaintiff contracted rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy
and asked her physicians whether her illness might have an adverse
effect on the health of her baby. According to the plaintiff, the
defendants assured her that she had nothing to fear. Relying on
these assurances, she failed to obtain a eugenic abortion and subse-
quently gave birth to a child suffering from substantial defects in
sight, hearing, speech, and physical condition. Thereafter, suit was
initiated in which damages were sought by the child for his birth
defects, by the mother for her emotional suffering, and by the father
for his medical expenses attributable to the child's abnormalities.
The court, in a divided opinion, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. A plurality" held that the infant's claim required the
impossible feat of valuing "life with defects against the utter void
of nonexistence."53 Similarly, the parents' claims were not legally
cognizable because of the impossibility of weighing the benefits of
parenthood against the alleged emotional and financial injuries suf-
50. This issue was raised in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d at 261-62, 190 N.E.2d at
859 (1963).
51. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
52. One justice concurred in the plurality opinion both because he agreed with its reason-
ing and, under his construction of relevant state law, the mother could not legally have
aborted the child. Two justices dissented in separate opinions. One declared that the suits
should have been entertained because plaintiffs' damages were capable of ascertainment, and
the public policy of the state would not be offended, because an abortion could legally have
been obtained. The other justice asserted that the parents (but not the child) suffered legally
cognizable injury.
53. 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
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fered. In addition, the plurality concluded that the parents' suit was
barred by public policy considerations involving the sanctity of the
child's worthwhile, albeit imperfect life. It was maintained that the
child's right to life outweighed the parents' interest in avoiding
emotional and financial injury. Of course, this argument has been
substantially weakened by the United States Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of a woman's unqualified right, during the first trimester,
to terminate her pregnancy."'
A salutary change in the law in this area was provided by
Jacobs v. Thiemer,55 a post-Roe case decided by the Supreme Court
of Texas. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician failed to
diagnose her affliction with rubella during her pregnancy and ap-
prise her of the risk of birth defects that it posed. It was further
alleged that, had plaintiff been so informed, she would have termi-
nated her pregnancy, and that as a consequence of the defendant's
54. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Another pre-Roe case denying damages for unfor-
tunate circumstances of life was Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296
N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (1970), aff'd
as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972). In Stewart, the defen-
dant -hospital refused to abort the rubella stricken plaintiff, and she gave birth to a child
afflicted with serious mental and physical defects. Jury verdicts in favor of the infant and
her parents were set aside on the grounds that their causes of action were unknown to the
law, the mother could not have legally obtained an abortion, and it was impossible to assess
the parents' damages.
Post-Roe cases have also denied recovery. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.
Ohio 1975), was a rubella case prosecuted by a mother as next friend for her son under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Summary judgment was granted for the defendant on two grounds:
(1) since there was no method of treatment the defendant could have employed to bring
about the plaintiff"s birth without defects, the defendant's failure to detect the mother's
rubella was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (2) insofar as plaintiff's
damages were predicated on the factum of his birth, he failed to state a legally cognizable
claim.
In LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976), plaintiffs alleged that, as a
result of the negligent performance of a sterilization operation on plaintiff-wife, a child
suffering from an umbilical hernia was born to them. Damages were demanded for the
expenses of raising the child and repairing his birth defect. The claim for the expense of
raising the child was dismissed on the authority of Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973), writ ref'd n.r.e., cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974), which refused to recognize
a cause of action for wrongful conception. Likewise, the claim for medical expenses was
dismissed, this time on the highly dubious ground that the umbilical hernia was not a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's alleged negligence. Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d
846, (Tex. 1975), was distinguished on the ground that, there, a negligent diagnosis was
responsible for the continuing development of a fetus which was highly susceptible to being
born with defects because of the mother's illness with rubella during the first trimester of
pregnancy.
55. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
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negligence, the plaintiff gave birth to a child with grave birth de-
fects and had expended $21,472 for medical treatments on his behalf
by the time of trial. Accordingly, the plaintiff, joined by her hus-
band, sought damages for their child's medical expenses, past and
future, and for their own mental suffering. The Supreme Court of
Texas, reversing a summary judgment for the defendant, held that
the complaint stated a cause of action and remanded for trial.
The court noted that the adverse judgment against the plain-
tiffs in the lower courts was prompted by the fact that eugenic
abortions were outlawed in the state during the tenure of the
plaintiff-mother's pregnancy. A majority of the court, however, did
not consider this factor dispositive, because the plaintiffs did not
fault the doctor for his failure to abort the fetus or recommend its
abortion, but merely for negligently failing to apprise the plaintiff-
mother of her condition and its ramifications. In essence, the plain-
tiffs alleged that, if the defendant had provided them with the infor-
mation which it was his duty to furnish, they would have circum-
vented the laws of the forum state." This is hardly the type of claim
one would expect to be upheld by a court of law, and the dissenting
justices were quick to seize upon the anomaly of the plaintiffs'
stance. Perhaps this is but another instance of the truism that hard
cases make bad law.57 Be that as it may, this hurdle overcome, the
court correctly perceived that the parents' claim for medical expen-
ses was free of the troublesome public policy issues present when the
child himself sues or the parents seek recovery for their mental
suffering. Therefore, the court recognized the parents' right of ac-
tion, limited to the "expenses reasonably necessary for the care and
maintenance of the child's physical impairment.""8 Note carefully,
however, that once the parents' cause of action for medical expenses
56. Thus, defendant's negligence was the cause in fact but not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries.
57. This criticism extends only to the court's treatment of the liability issue under the
law existing at the time of the physician's alleged negligence. If the pregnancy had occurred
after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), however, the parents would certainly have been
entitled to damages for-medical expenses if the fetus would have been aborted but for the
physician's negligence. Then, not only causation, but proximate cause, would have existed,
because the parents' proposed course of action, had they been properly informed, would have
been legal.
58. 519 S.W.2d at 850. See also Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975), a rubella case in which the court rejected an infant's claim of "wrongful
life" but held that her parents' claim for medical expenses incident to raising the deformed
child stated a cause of action.
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is allowed, any interest in the child's right of action for medical
expenses is purely academic, because he is being compensated
through his parents."
It is submitted, however, that, having gone this far, the court
erred in failing to allow the parents to recover damages for their
emotional suffering. The primary objection stated to the award of
such damages is the supposed impossibility of balancing the re-
wards and heartaches of being the parents of a child afflicted with
birth defects. Instinctively, however, one senses that what the
courts fear is not the impossibility of the balancing act but a harsh
quality of life judgment, expressed in monetary terms, that the child
represents more trouble than he is worth. Once it is realized that a
damage award would not imply such a value judgment, however,
the objections to the parents' cause of action dissolve. What needs
to be appreciated is that the parents do not sue because the child
is unloved or a burden; they sue because they must live with the
excruciating pain of seeing a child whom they dearly love face life
under harsh disabilities. Thus, it becomes apparent that a damage
award would symbolize not a lack of love but the very essence of
parental love and devotion.
59. Should the child be able to sue for medical expenses in lieu of the parents? The
child's right of action has uniformly been denied by the courts on the ground that he lacks
standing to claim that his own life is wrongful. This view is typified by the plurality opinion
in Gleitman v. Cosgrove:
The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life with
defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such
a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he should not have been
born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his
alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required
by compensatory remedies.
49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). A New York court put the matter more succinctly,
stating that "a plaintiff has no remedy against a defendant whose offense is that he failed to
consign the plaintiff to oblivion." Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 436,
296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970),
aff'd as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 233 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
It is suggested, however, that this analysis is inapposite because the infant-plaintiff does
not complain that his life is wrongful but that the defendant should make it right. After all,
were it not for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would not be alive at all, so it is logical
that the plaintiff should look to the defendant to alleviate the unfortunate circumstances of
his life. The plaintiff asks not for pity but that the defendant, who is responsible for the
plaintiff's life, make it a true blessing.
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V. CONCLUSION
The term "wrongful life" has proved to be a seductive one, and
there has been a tendency on the part of courts and commentators
to characterize all of the causes of action discussed in this article
under that heading. This is an unfortunate practice, because it
tends to blur the distinctions among them.
It is suggested that the phrase "wrongful conception" be used
to denominate the cause of action in the unsuccessful sterilization
and contraception cases, for it is at the instant of conception that
the damage occurs. After all, it is for the purpose of preventing
conception that the sterilization operation is undergone or contra-
ception is practiced, so, when notwithstanding resort to these pre-
cautionary measures, a child is nevertheless conceived, there is
cause for complaint. That the injury is not damnum absque injuria
was established beyond peradventure by Griswold v. Connecticut"
and reemphasized by Roe v. Wade.6 Who has standing to complain
is less certain, however. Surely the parents are aggrieved, but the
standing of prior born children is subject to question. Although it
has been stated, by way of dictum, that prior born children may
recover for the loss of that portion of their parents' affection and
support occasioned by the birth of an unplanned sibling," when
prior born children have actually sued on this premise, they have
not survived the defendant's motion to dismiss. 3 The damages re-
coverable by the parents include physical and mental pain and
suffering, medical expenses, loss of consortium, possibly lost wages,
and, of course, compensation for any physical injuries received as a
result of conception or birth of the child. The greatest area of debate
centers around the recoverability of the expense of raising the un-
planned child. Those courts which have permitted such damages
have, for the most part, allowed the defendant an offset for the
benefit to the parents resulting from the birth of the child."' It is
submitted, however, that this offset should not be allowed to the
extent that the benefit is noneconomic, for no amount of emotional
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
63. Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974); Aronoff v. Snider, 292
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).




pleasure will enable a family to meet the financial burdens of raising
a child, and thus, the allowance of such an offset would penalize the
child and the family because of the family's socially desirable affec-
tion for the child. If an analogy may be drawn, surely no one would
suggest that an award of child support, in a domestic relations case,
should be reduced in accordance with the custodial parent's love for
the child. The noncustodial parent is required to pay support be-
cause he is partially responsible for the birth of the child, and the
payment of support is required for its welfare. To an even greater
extent, the negligent defendant in a wrongful conception case is
regponsible for the birth of the unplanned child, because the parents
took reasonable precautions to prevent its conception. Therefore,
the defendant should pay the total cost of raising the unplanned
child because, from a legal standpoint, he is solely responsible for
its birth, and the payment of support is required for the welfare of
the child. 5
The illegitimate child, on the other hand, essentially seeks to
recover for emotional trauma resulting from the stigma of bastardy.
The courts have rightfully made short shrift of the plaintiff-child's
asserted right to compensation for the impairment of his inheritance
prospects and the denial of a happy home because he is not legally
entitled to either. It is suggested that the action for emotional
trauma resulting from the stigma of bastardy is no more meritorious
because its recognition could imperil family harmony, promote love-
less marriages, provide an incentive to abort illegitimates, result in
the imposition of a greater duty on the fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren than on fathers of legitimate children, and punish parents for
society's narrow-mindedness.
The true "wrongful life" case arises when a physician negli-
gently fails to apprise a pregnant woman of the probability of una-
voidable birth defects in time to abort the fetus. Only recently have
the courts begun to recognize a right of action in parents, under such
circumstances, for the recovery of medical expenses attendant to
raising the child. 6 No case has awarded damages to the child, him-
self, on the ground that he lacks standing to complain that his own
65. The defendant would not be entitled to visitation, however, for his negligence does
not confer any rights upon him.
66. Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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life is wrongful, and this is a clear case of a meritorious cause of
action being denied because of its ill-chosen label. It is submitted
that the child's life is not wrongful, but neither is it as it should be.
Therefore, since that life would not have come into being but for the
physician's negligence, it is the physician who should pay the medi-
cal expenses necessary to nurture the child. Similarly, no case has
awarded emotional damages to the parents, but this is because the
essential nature of these damages has been misunderstood. Rather
than berating the child's worth, such damages would epitomize the
high station he holds in his parents' hearts.
